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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Joel W. Townsend*
Admissibility in Evidence of Scientific Tests for Alcoholic Intoxi-
catlon-In the case of Novak v. District of Columbia, 49 At. (2d)
88 (District of Columbia, 1946), the defendant was involved in an
accident and arrested for drunken driving. While he was being
detained at the police station, a policeman requested a sample of
his urine and the defendant agreed to give it. The officer did not
inform the defendant that he had a right to refuse to give the sam-
ple, nor was the defendant advised that the sample might be used
as evidence against him. The officer did state, however, that "if
the sample was right it would be to the defendant's benefit."
The defendant was prosecuted for driving an automobile while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The trial judge, over
objection, admitted in evidence the laboratory records of the uri-
nalysis which showed "an alcoholic content of .24 of 1%," and a
physician testified, as an expert, that in his opinion a chemical
analysis of a sample of urine showing that amount of alcohol indi-
cated that the defendant was under the influence of an intoxicating
beverage at the time of his arrest. Several witnesses testified that
immediately after the accident the defendant appeared to be under
the influence of intoxicants. Other witnesses, both prosecution and
defense, testified that he did not appear to be under the influence
of intoxicants. The defendant was found guilty. Perhaps the evi-
dence regarding the urinalysis was decisive in the minds of the jury.
The history of the bottle containing the specimen of urine was
recited in some detail by the state's witnesses. Before taking the
sample, the officer washed the bottle; after taking the sample he
replaced the cork stopper, labeled the bottle with defendant's name,
time and place and his own initials, but the bottle was never sealed.
The officer took the bottle home that night and kept it in his refrig-
erator. The next morning he delivered the same to the chemist at
the District Health laboratories. The sample was stored in an un-
locked refrigerator at the laboratory with about twenty other sam-
ples of urine. The refrigerator was accessible to about eleven per-
sons employed in the laboratory. Two different chemists made sep-
arate analyses and both checked exactly.
The defendant appealed upon three grounds: first, that testimony
regarding the urinalysis was improperly admitted because it was
insufficiently identified and proved to be in the same condition when
taken and when analyzed; second, that the specimen was obtained
by inducement or compulsion and thus constituted an illegal search
and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and third, that
the taking and use of the specimen constituted a compulsory self-
incrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
The Municipal Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia af-
firmed the conviction and held: first, that the laboratory records
of the urinalysis were properly admitted in evidence as they were
kept in conformity with the formal tests prescribed by the Federal
Shop Book Statute, and that there was sufficient evidence that the
specimen taken from the defendant and the one analyzed by the
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chemists, and reported on in court, were the same and were in sub-
stantially the same condition when tested as when taken, and that
there was no evidence of deliberate tampering with the bottle to the
disadvantage of the defendant; second, that evidence obtained from
a person under legal arrest and a chemical analysis of such evidence
is not an illegal search and seizure; third, even if the giving of such
a specimen is classed with making a confession, the admission of
the results of the analyses in evidence was proper, as it is not
essential to the admissibility of a confession that it should appear
that the person was warned that what he said would be used against
him. If the confession was voluntary it is sufficient. The giving
of the specimen by the defendant was voluntary and the officer's
statement was not an inducement to the defendant. A person of
ordinary intelligence would draw from the officer's statement the
inference that if the specimen was "not right," it would not be to
the defendant's benefit. The weight to be given to the results of
the urinalyses and the medical testimony on the meaning thereof
was for the jury to determine. The Court then pointed out that
it was unnecessary for it to decide that taking such a specimen is
like taking a prisoner's fingerprints, making him submit to be
photographed, making him display his body, or trying on a coat to
see if it fits, since in this case the specimen was given voluntarily
while the defendant was under legal arrest.
In the case of Kirschwing v. Farrar, 114 Colo. 421, 166 P. (2d)
154 (1946), a police officer was found unconscious while on duty.
He was taken to the hospital where a blood alcohol test was made.
The result of this test disclosed "Alcohol 3.9 mg. per cc. of Blood,"
an amount considered sufficient in most humans to induce a high
state of intoxication. The officer was subsequently dismissed from
the police force because of such misconduct. Upon his trial before
the City Manager of Safety, the result of the blood alcohol test was
admitted in evidence. The defendant contended, however, that he
had suffered an epileptic seizure and became unconscious, and other
witnesses present testified that they did not believe he had an
"alcoholic breath." Upon review the Civil Service Commission sus-
tained the dismissal. The defendant then instituted action in the
Denver District Court and, after a trial to the court, an order was
entered reinstating the defendant on the ground that there was a
failure in the proof to sustain the charges, as the proof was based
on the blood alcohol test.
The Supreme Court of Colorado, on appeal by the Manager of
Safety, reversed the lower court, and held that the Manager of
Safety and t- a Civil Service Commission could properly consider
the evidence &. the blood alcohol test; that there was sufficient com-
petent evidence to support the finding; and that they did not abuse
their discretion in so finding.
The Court remarked that it had been unable to find any case
where the blood test to determine intoxication was excluded be-
cause of its unreliable value as proof, and then noted that blood
alcohol test evidence had been upheld in two recent cases. One of
the cases was State v. Cram, 176 Or. 577, 160 P. (2d) 283 (1945),
a criminal case in which the defendant unsuccessfully urged the
constitutional objection against self-incrimination to the use of a
blood alcohol test taken while he v-;as unconscious and under arrest.
The Court there held that the defendant was not deprived of any
of his constitutional rights, and compared the taking of the blood
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sample to that of fingerprints procured under compulsion. However,
the Oregon Court pointed out that it was not deciding that an ac-
cused can be forced to undergo a physical examination or submit
to a blood test as the question of unlawful search and seizure was
not involved in the case and the defendant was under arrest at the
time the blood sample was taken. The other case was Haidon u.
Woodhouse, 113 Colo. 504, 160 P. (2d) 998 (1945), where in a civil
action for damages as a result of an automobile collision the injured
party introduced into evidence the results of a test for alcohol in
the blood of the defendant. The blood sample had been taken from
him while he was still unconscious in the hospital after the accident
upon the request of a public officer who had been summoned to the
scene of the accident. Both the physician and the laboratory tech-
nician testified that the analysis showed sufficient blood alcohol to
cause a state of intoxication in the average person, the objection
being overruled that the confidential relation between physician and
patient had been violated.
Cne judge dissented in the principal case, on the ground that
from the time the blood sample was taken until it was examined,
integrity of identity of the sample did not attend.
(For a complete discussion of the aspects of this problem see:
Mamet, B.M., Constitutionality of Compulsory Chemical Tests to
Determine Alcoholic Intoxication, 36 Jour. Crim. Law & Criminol-
ogy 132-147 (1945). Also see another relatively recent case upon
this subject: State v. Nutt-- Ohio St. -, 65 N.E. (2d) 675,
(1946) holding admissible in evidence the testimony of a policeman
and a doctor that the defendant refused to submit to a physical ex-
amination or furnish a sample of urine. The Nutt case was ab-
stracted in the July-Aug., 1946 number of this Journal.)
Admissibility of Confessions - A recent issue of the Texas Law
Review (Vol. XXIV, No. 3, April, 1946), contains an article of spe-
cial interest and importance to law enforcement officers. Its author
is Charles T. McCormick, Dean and Professor of Law at the Uni-
versity of Texas, and the article is entitled "Some Problems and
Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions."
Dean McCormick first observes that there is no special danger of
untrustworthiness of confessions from abnormal self-accusations
or hallucinations as those cases are much more often encountered
by the doctors than by the police, and where they do come before
the police, they are usually, though not always, recognizable as ab-
normal by experienced officers. He adds that against the possibili-
ties of mistake, falsehood and hallucination, common sense urges
the insistent and ever-present force of self-interest or self-protec-
tion. However, "the gravest special danger of untrustworthiness
in the use of confessions, is the danger of duress, of such pressure
that the victim's reluctance to make a confession which in the long
run will lose him life or liberty is converted to a willingness to
accept this hazard whose consequence is deferred, in order to es-
cape a more terrifying immediate evil." The various methods of
subjecting suspected persons to direct and indirect pressures were
referred to, and it was pointed out that prolonged and insistent
questioning alone seems effective to shatter the resistance of at
least the average casual suspect who is not a professional criminal.
The digests for the twenty year period 1926-1945 reveal 94 appeals
in which the appellant claimed force or threats in securing a con-
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fession. "Upon such limited data, it seems probable," according
to Dean McCormick, "that third degree practices are still prevalent
in many parts of the country." He further states that such practices
.constitute a betrayal and a mockery of those principles of respect
for the worth of the individual citizen upon which our religious
ideas, our constitution, and our philosophy of government rest."
The author then said that it may well be doubted whether confes-
sions of guilt, even where they are extorted by pressure of force
or fear, are not reasonably trustworthy, because from a random
selection of sixty-five criminal convictions where convincing proof
later appeared of the innocence of the accused, in only seven of these
cases was there evidence of a confession. The predominant motive
of the courts in shaping special rules restricting the admissibility
of confessions has been that of protecting the citizen against the
violation of his privileges of immunity from bodily manhandling
by the police and from other undue pressures of the third degree.
Dean McCormick then discussed in detail the existing safeguards
attending the use of confessions: the requirement that where a
confession is relied upon the prosecution must nevertheless produce
other evidence independent of the confession in order to establish
the corpus delicti and to corroborate the confession; the require-
ment that the confession must not have been induced by force,
threats, or promise of leniency, but must have been voluntary; state
statutory regulations attempting to safeguard the use of confes-
sions; federal control of state administration of justice through the
due process clause of the Federal Constitution; and the new federal
doctrine of the inadmissibility in federal trials of confessions se-
cured while the accused is unlawfully detained in violation of fed-
eral arraignment statutes.
The author briefly discusses the present English practice in re-
spect to questioning prisoners-a practice which does not permit the
questioning of a prisoner or a person in custody about any crime
or offense with which he is or may be charged except for the pur-
pose of removing "elementary and obvious ambiguities in voluntary
statements." Dean McCormick points out that such a practice could
only be maintained in a community where the crime rate is rela-
tively low, where the police are highly efficient and trained to a
strong sense of professional ethics, and where the community has
a regard for civil rights so strong that it will insist upon the main-
tenance of these rights even in favor of the disreputable and the
outcast.
The Unite States Supreme Court decisions which condemn con-
victions in s-tde courts on involuntary confessions as denials of due
process have declared doctrines which are binding on state courts
and state legislatures as well. Already, states Dean McCormick,
they have made their impress on state decisions, as the state courts
are reversing convictions on the ground that the confession was
secured by protracted questioning.
Under the federal and state statutes which require production
of the prisoner "immediately" or "forthwith," any detention for in-
terrogation, however brief, may be questioned. Dean McCormick
suggests that probably the interests of civil liberty and of effective
investigation of crimes can best be balanced by a relaxing of the
requirement for "immediate" production, and the establishment
of a specific limit of perhaps twenty-four hours for detention.
Another reform designed to remove the pressure felt by the police
LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
obliging them to resort to the abuses of the third-degree was sug-
gested for consideration. This was the inauguration of a procedure,
necessitating legislation and constitutional amendment, to give a
legal opportunity for extended examination before a magistrate
of every person arrested and charged with a crime, wherein he
would be given the right to have counsel and then interrogated by
the magistrate. His recorded answers would then be admissible in
evidence in subsequent proceedings; but, if he chose not to answer,
either counsel or the court should be permitted to comment on his
refusal.
In his article Dean McCormick concluded that there is no cure-all
to the problem, as abstention from third-degree abuses will still
depend on the ability of the police to protect society without resort
to them; but he felt that science can be a substitute for cruelty,
and added: "The lie-detector has proved its value, when profes-
sionally conducted and interpreted. If adequate safeguards could
be provided, the questioning of suspects under narcosis might offer
possibilities for protecting the innocent and discovering the guilty.
Other methods of scientific proof, apart from examination of sus-
pects, may likewise make extorted confessions unnecessary. Ex-
amples are fingerprint, handwriting, and typewriting identifica-
tion; firearms identification, and blood-tests. Manifestly, the full
use of these resources for the protection of society against crime
can only be accomplished by a well-selected, professionally-trained
body of law enforcement officers." (Copies of this issue of the Texas
Law Review may be obtained for $1.00. University of Texas Pub-
lication of the School of Law, Austin, Texas.)
